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ABSTRACT
Th e participation of the local and regional authorities in EU processes should be promoted 
and enhanced by the EU, the Member States and the same local/regional authorities. Th ese 
should perform a stronger role in the constitutional architecture of the EU. In this way they 
would contribute more eff ectively to a limited, balanced and legitimate system of governance 
based on constitutionalism within the EU. Th e participation of sub-national authorities 
in the EU reconciles European integration with the multi-level systems of governance of 
the Member States; strengthens the legitimacy of EU and national (EU-related) decision-
making processes; and reinforces the legal limitation of the decision-making power of both 
Union institutions and national authorities.
Keywords: democracy in the EU; European constitutionalism; legitimacy of EU decision-
making; local and regional authorities in the EU; multi-level governance in the EU
§1. AIMS AND METHODOLOGY
Th e Lisbon Treaty acknowledges the key role of the local and regional authorities in the 
constitutional architecture of the EU. In this respect the relevant Treaty provisions are:
(i) Article 4(2) TEU, pursuant to which the Union shall respect the national identities 
of the Member States ‘inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government’ (emphasis added);
* Research Fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation at the Eberhard Karls Universität 
Tübingen, Germany, and Reader in EU Law and Comparative Public Law, Liverpool John Moores 
University (LJMU), UK.
Carlo Panara
612 23 MJ 4 (2016)
(ii) Article 5(3) TEU, according to which ‘in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be suffi  ciently achieved by the Member States, either at central level 
or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or eff ects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved at Union level’ (emphasis added); and
(iii) Article  10(3) TEU which entails the aspiration that decisions shall be taken as 
openly and as closely as possible to the citizen. Th is provision is part of Article 10 
TEU which is devoted to the democratic principle.
From the Treaty of Lisbon it emerges that the full realization of three key principles 
of EU law (protection of the national identity of the Member States, subsidiarity, and 
democracy) requires that the powers of the sub-national authorities are protected, 
but also that the sub-national authorities perform an active role in the EU. Th is is 
particularly evident in the involvement of regional parliaments with legislative powers 
in the early warning system (see Article 6(1) Subsidiarity Protocol) and in the fact that, 
when possible, decisions shall be taken by the level of government which is closest to the 
citizen (see Article 10(3) TEU).
Th e key importance of an active role of local and regional authorities is further 
highlighted in documents of the Commission and of the Committee of the Regions 
(CoR). Th e White Paper on European Governance of 2001 places substantial emphasis 
on communication between the sub-national authorities and the EU. To this purpose it 
lays down recommendations with the fundamental objective to enhance the legitimacy 
of EU decisions, but also to promote ‘good governance’ in the EU.1 Th e CoR’s White 
Paper on Multilevel Governance (MLG) of 2009 focuses on two key elements: (i) 
the implementation of EU and national law and policy at regional and local level 
(‘translating European or national objectives into local or regional action’); and (ii) the 
involvement of local and regional authorities in EU law-making and policymaking both 
at EU and at national level (‘integrating the objectives of local and regional authorities 
within the strategies of the European Union (…) and encourage their participation in 
the coordination of European policy’).2 Th e key objectives of the CoR are to enhance 
the ‘democratic legitimacy’ of Union action and to promote ‘good governance’. Th e 
Commission’s Agenda 2020 further emphasizes the role of local and regional authorities 
in delivering EU policy objectives, but also their contribution to the elaboration of 
national reform programmes implementing the EU strategy.3
1 European Commission, White Paper on European Governance, COM(2001) 428, p. 10–11.
2 CoR, White Paper on MLG, CdR 89/2009, 17–18 June 2009, p. 6–7. See also the Opinion of the CoR, 
Building a European Culture of Multilevel Governance: Follow-up from the Committee of the Regions’ 
White Paper (94th plenary session 15–16 February 2012).
3 Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth, COM(2010) 2020 fi nal, p. 6, 29.
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All of this demonstrates the high normative value that EU primary law, the 
Commission and CoR ascribe to local and regional participation in the EU. However, 
the positive or negative impact of such participation is the subject of discussion among 
scholars. Pernice highlights that constitutionalism in the EU (which he calls ‘multilevel 
constitutionalism’) requires the participation of local and regional authorities in the 
legislative process of the EU in order to compensate for the loss of autonomy resulting 
from the shift  of powers to the European level, but also to provide European legislation 
with the necessary experience and knowledge from the ground. Th e participation he has 
in mind includes preliminary consultation with the local and regional authorities and 
particularly an important role for the CoR.4
Th e views of other scholars are less optimistic. Peters and Pierre, for example, identify 
a ‘Faustian bargain’ in the opaque negotiation of policy taking place among players 
from diff erent levels within the EU.5 Similarly, DeBardeleben and Hurrelmann argue 
that while MLG is likely to increase ‘output legitimacy’ (that is, the problem-solving 
capacity of the EU), it is also likely to reduce ‘input legitimacy’ (essentially, democratic 
legitimacy) because of increased diffi  culties in calling leaders to account. Moreover, 
while MLG in the EU may open up more room for participation and deliberation, it 
may also undermine the equal representation of all the citizens in the decision-making 
process.6 It has to be highlighted, however, that these scholars construe MLG essentially 
as negotiation of policy by the sub-national players on the EU level. Yet, the notion of 
MLG emerging from the CoR’s White Paper (see above) goes beyond the mere lobbying 
activity of the local and regional offi  ces in Brussels and embraces the ‘offi  cial’ channels 
created at Member State, as well as at EU level (such as, in particular, the CoR).
A number of scholars (Eppler, Abels, Nettesheim and so on) focus on the specifi c 
problem of participation of sub-national parliaments in the EU. Th ey draw attention to 
the risk that local/regional participation in the EU could be focused exclusively on the 
‘executive powers’, in this way frustrating the role and constitutional status of the sub-
national parliaments.7
4 See I. Pernice, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union’, Walter Hallstein-Institut Paper 5, 
www.whi-berlin.de/documents/whi-paper0502.pdf, p. 11. On the theory of multilevel constitutionalism 
see also I. Pernice, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-
Making Revisited’, 36 Common Market Law Review (1999), p. 703 et seq.
5 B.G. Peters and J. Pierre, ‘Multi-level Governance and Democracy: A Faustian Bargain?’, in I. Bache and 
M. Flinders (eds.), Multi-level Governance (OUP, 2004), p. 87.
6 J. DeBardeleben and A. Hurrelmann, ‘Conclusion’, in J. DeBardeleben and A. Hurrelmann (eds.), 
Democratic Dilemmas of Multilevel Governance (Palgrave, 2007), p. 240.
7 See, in particular, A. Eppler, ‘Vertikal und horizontal, bi- und multilateral: Interparlamentarische 
Beziehungen in EU-Angelegenheiten’, in G. Abels and A. Eppler (eds.), Auf dem Weg zum 
Mehrebenenparlamentarismus? Funktionen von Parlamenten im politischen System der EU (Nomos, 2011), 
p. 297 et seq.; G. Abels, ‘Wandel oder Kontinuität? Zur Europaarbeit der deutschen Landesparlamente 
nach dem Lissabon-Vertrag und dem Lissabon-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’, in G. Abels and 
A. Eppler (eds.), Auf dem Weg zum Mehrebenenparlamentarismus? Funktionen von Parlamenten im 
politischen System der EU, p. 279 et seq.; M. Nettesheim, ‘Die Integrationsverantwortung der Länder 
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It is still unclear, therefore, whether, how, and to what extent local and regional 
authorities really contribute to a ‘good’ system of governance within the EU, namely 
a balanced, limited and legitimate system of governance inspired by the principles of 
constitutionalism.
Th is study aims to address the question of whether, how and to what extent, certain 
key goals of constitutionalism are fulfi lled through the participation of local and 
regional authorities in the formulation and implementation of EU law and policy. Th e 
notion of constitutionalism used in this study is the notion typical of the Anglo-Saxon 
constitutional tradition, according to which the exercise of power shall be limited and 
subject to rules, checks and balances, including judicial review.8 Th is study will focus 
on fi ve aspects of constitutionalism in the context of the EU: the relationship between 
EU integration and national constitutions; the democratic legitimacy of EU decision-
making; the accountability of decision-makers; the procedural and substantive limits to 
the exercise of decision-making power; and the power-limiting role of judicial review. 
Th ese aspects will be analysed to assess if, how and to what extent local and regional 
authorities have an impact (and what impact) on constitutionalism in the EU multilevel 
system of governance and to evaluate their positive or negative contribution to this 
system of governance. Despite the abundance of studies on the sub-national authorities 
in the EU, this particular aspect of constitutionalism in the EU has never been developed 
systematically by research in the fi eld.
Following the same path of earlier works9 and of EU primary law, this study will 
focus on the ‘local and regional authorities’, which will be described here as the ‘sub-
national’ level of government within the EU. Th is approach should not be mistaken 
for a suggestion that there is or there should be an undiff erentiated sub-national level 
of government across the EU.10 Th is methodology is consistent with the EU primary 
law, which does not diff erentiate between the two categories of sub-national authorities 
(see the Treaty provisions and the documents referred to previously; the only exception 
– Folgerungen aus dem Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 30. Juni 2009 (“Lissabon-Urteil”)’, 
Tübingen, 30  July 2009. See also B. Crum and J.E. Fossum, ‘Th e Multilevel Parliamentary fi eld: A 
framework for the representative democracy in the EU’, 1 European Political Science Review (2009), 
p. 249–271.
8 See C.H. McIlwain, Constitutionalism. Ancient & Modern (Great Seal Books, 1947). See also N. 
Matteucci, Breve storia del costituzionalismo (Morcelliana, 2010 [originally published in 1964]); M. 
Fioravanti, Costituzionalismo. Percorsi della storia e tendenze attuali (Laterza, 2009).
9 See in particular S. Weatherill and U. Bernitz (eds.), Th e Role of Regions and Sub-National Actors 
in Europe (Hart, 2005); S. Mangiameli, ‘Th e Role of Regional and Local Government in European 
Governance’, in H.-J. Blanke and S. Mangiameli (eds.), Governing Europe under a Constitution 
(Springer, 2006), p. 457 et seq.
10 See C. Moore, ‘A Europe of the Regions vs. the Regions in Europe: Refl ections on Regional Engagement 
in Brussels’, 18 Regional & Federal Studies (2008), p. 524: ‘Devolution and decentralization across the 
EU’s member states has not resulted in anything approaching a single “third level” of constitutional 
actors. Signifi cant variations in policy competences are identifi able across even the strongest tier of 
actors below the national level, limiting the extent to which these actors can lobby jointly on policy 
issues’.
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to this lack of diff erentiation is Article 6(1) of the Lisbon Subsidiarity Protocol, which 
envisages consultation with ‘regional parliaments with legislative powers’). Th e CoR is 
the representative of both local and regional authorities, even though the heterogeneous 
composition of the CoR, due to the multifarious and potentially confl icting interests 
within this body, is oft en fl agged up as a weakness of local/regional representation within 
the EU.11 Th e distinction between ‘local’ and ‘regional’ is sometimes ambiguous even at 
the national level. For example, all the French territorial communities are ultimately all 
of the same nature, irrespective of their level (‘regions’, ‘departments’, ‘communes’). In 
the UK the concept of ‘local authority’ is almost all-embracing in that it includes both 
smaller authorities (councils of boroughs) and larger authorities, such as the combined 
authorities (Greater Manchester, Liverpool City Region and so on), which soon may 
even enjoy devolved legislative powers similar to those of the devolved administrations 
in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Th e concept of ‘region’ also lends itself to 
speculation in that a Spanish Autonomous Community is very diff erent from a French 
Region, a Belgian Community is very diff erent from an Italian Region and so on. Th e 
only reliable distinction in this fi eld is probably between regions with and without 
legislative powers.12
However, also the legislative powers of the regions are very diff erent in the various 
Member States and the constitutional standing of these regions may vary accordingly. 
Th is group of regions would include a micro-region, such as Åland, and a federated 
entity, such as the Land Baden-Württemberg, whose size and GDP are comparable to 
that of some Member States. Whenever required by the study, it will be clarifi ed whether 
a conclusion would apply to all the sub-national authorities or only to certain types of 
authorities. Most examples of sub-national participation in the EU used in this article 
will refer to ‘regional authorities’ for the simple reason that these authorities enjoy 
powers and benefi t from resources which increase the opportunities of interaction with 
Union institutions. It has also to be taken into account that there are diff erent national 
solutions to the problem of local/regional participation in the EU, with some Member 
States adopting a more centralistic approach (for example, France or the UK) and others 
prompting participation opportunities for the sub-national authorities (especially but 
not exclusively for the regions).13 Th erefore the approach chosen by this study to consider 
11 See, inter alia, E. Domorenok, ‘Th e Committee of the Regions: in Search of Identity’, 19 Regional & 
Federal Studies (2009), p. 146. Th e diffi  culty for the CoR to represent sub-national interests is evidenced 
also by the creation of ‘political groups’ within the CoR. See S. Ricci, ‘Th e Committee of the Regions 
and the Challenge of European Governance’, in C. Panara and A. De Becker (eds.), Th e Role of the 
Regions in EU Governance (Springer, 2011), p. 115.
12 See Article 6(1) Lisbon Subsidiarity Protocol. Th e regions from the EU with legislative powers created 
two ad hoc associations: REGLEG (Conference of European Regions with Legislative Power) and 
CALRE (Conference of European Regional Legislative Assemblies).
13 On the diff erent approaches to sub-national participation in the EU see P. Popelier, ‘Subnational 
multilevel constitutionalism’, 6 Perspectives on Federalism (2014), p. 1–23. See also C. Panara and A. De 
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the ‘local and regional authorities’ will simplify the analysis without sacrifi cing the 
methodological rigour.
§2. THE ROLE OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL PARTICIPATION 
IN RECONCILING EU INTEGRATION WITH 
THE MEMBER STATES’ MULTILAYERED SYSTEMS 
OF GOVERNANCE
All the Member States feature a constitutional framework which includes regional and/
or local self-government. Given that the Member States are also part of the EU, and 
that every, or nearly every, EU policy is likely to interfere with the responsibilities or 
the interests of the sub-national communities, one might be faced with reciprocally 
contradicting propositions. On the one hand, the Member States’ constitutions value 
regional and local autonomy and ascribe to it the status of a qualifying feature of their 
constitutional framework. On the other, a considerable degree of that autonomy might 
have been diluted or even relinquished through the acceptance of an increased role of the 
EU. In reality, dynamics are more complex as EU integration does not always diminish 
local/regional autonomy. Sometimes the EU may strengthen local and regional entities 
by entering into direct relations with them, ignoring the central government’s gatekeeper 
function. However, this is an exception in the current framework of the EU and it is 
mainly limited to the allocation of certain EU funding streams and to the lobbying and 
representation activity of the local or regional offi  ces in Brussels.14
Th ere are at least three strategies to reconcile local/regional autonomy and the 
growing role of the EU. A fi rst strategy is the doctrine of ‘counterlimits’, that is, the 
limits to the principle of supremacy of EU law. According to principle of supremacy 
of EU law, as construed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) since 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft , EU law shall prevail over any rule of domestic law, 
Becker (eds.), Th e Role of the Regions in EU Governance; R. Toniatti, F. Palermo and M. Dani (eds.), An 
Ever More Complex Union (Nomos, 2004).
14 An important element of the theory of MLG in the EU is that there might be direct relations between 
sub-national players (not only sub-national authorities) and the EU institutions: see L. Hooghe and G. 
Marks, Multi-Level Governance and European Integration (Rowman & Littlefi eld, 2001), p. 28–29. See 
also S. Piattoni, Th e Th eory of Multi-level Governance. Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges 
(OUP, 2010). Examples of overlap between EU and regional responsibilities include: education and 
culture (Belgium, Germany, UK and France); hunting (Belgium, Austria and Italy); fi sheries (Belgium, 
Spain, Italy, Austria and UK); environment (Austria, Spain and Italy); agriculture (Belgium, Austria, 
Spain, Italy and UK); social welfare (Austria and Spain); radio/TV (Belgium and Germany); energy 
(Belgium and UK); economic development (Belgium, UK and France); public procurement law 
(Austria and Italy); economic planning, industry, transport, health, taxation, and consumer protection 
(Belgium and Spain).
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including constitutional law.15 By analogy, one may argue that on the basis of a rigid 
application of the principle of supremacy the centripetal push towards integration in the 
EU (ultimately, the transfers of powers from the Member States to the EU) could always 
legitimately erode the autonomy of the sub-state authorities. However, this solution to 
possible confl icts between EU integration and sub-national authorities would not be 
viable.
It is well known that a number of national courts have placed limits on the 
prevalence of EU law in order to protect certain constitutional values (doctrine of the 
‘counterlimits’).16 As previously mentioned, Article 4(2) TEU includes regional and local 
self-government among the ‘fundamental constitutional structures’ which are part of 
the ‘national identity’ that the Union is obliged to respect.17 Admittedly, it needs to be 
demonstrated on a case-by-case basis that a certain ‘constitutional structure’ refl ects 
the ‘national identity’, and particularly that a certain MLG arrangement refl ects that 
identity and therefore enjoys the protection of Article 4(2) TEU.18 Yet the constitutional 
laws of some Member States strongly corroborate the claim that regional and local self-
government are an integral part of their ‘constitutional identity’, if not even of their 
‘national identity’, with the result that repeal or limitation of these by force of EU or 
national law would not be legally feasible without a more fundamental change of the 
‘constitutional identity’ of the state. Some examples will be laid out below to illustrate 
the point.
Th e federal principle in Austria is a key element of the constitutional system. 
Accordingly, a major restriction of the powers of the Länder or of the municipalities 
would require a total revision of the Federal Constitution, meaning a radical change 
15 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft  mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel, EU:C:1970:114.
16 See, for example, the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court concerning the 
protection of fundamental rights (see especially Solange I, Ruling of 29  May 1974, and Solange II, 
Ruling of 22  October 1986); the protection vis-à-vis ultra vires action of the EU (see Maastricht, 
Ruling of 12  October 1993, and Honeywell/Mangold, Ruling of 6  July 2010); the protection of the 
constitutional identity of the Federal Republic of Germany (see Lisbon, Ruling of 30 June 2009) and 
of democratic legitimacy in the EU multilevel system of governance (see Maastricht and Lisbon). See 
also the ‘controlimiti doctrine’ of the Italian Constitutional Court (Ruling No. 183 of 27 December 
1973 and Ruling No. 170 of 8 June 1984) and the statement of the French Conseil Constitutionnel who, 
in a case concerning a law transposing a directive, declared that the core of the French Constitution 
shall not be undermined (Ruling of 25 July 2006; see also the Ruling of the Conseil d’État of 8 February 
2007).
17 On the key importance of local and regional self-government for the protection of the national identity 
of the Member States see I. Pernice, ‘Th e Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action’, 15 
Columbia Journal of European Law (2009), p. 394. See also the Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak 
in Case C-324/07 Coditel Brabant SPRL v. Commune d’Uccle and Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, 
EU:C:2008:317, para. 85.
18 See E. Cloots, National Identity in EU Law (OUP, 2015), p. 127 et seq.
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of the ‘constitutional identity’ of the Austrian state.19 Similarly, in Germany the Basic 
Law rules out any constitutional amendment aff ecting the division of the country into 
Länder, their participation on principle being in the legislative process and the federal 
character of the state. Th ese limits to constitutional revision do not apply only internally 
(within Germany), but also in relation to all transfers of powers to the EU.20 Th ey could be 
overcome only by an entirely new constitution refl ecting a new ‘constitutional identity’.21
Due to the fl uidity of its unwritten constitution, in this context the UK is a 
very interesting case study. According to the orthodox doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty,22 the UK Parliament can modify any earlier statute: in principle it would 
have the power to give any responsibility to the local authorities, but it could also 
take everything away from them. However, over the last few decades, the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty in its traditional form has been challenged repeatedly. For 
example, in the case Th oburn v. Sunderland Laws LJ held that the doctrine of implied 
repeal did not apply to the confl ict between an earlier ‘constitutional statute’ and a later 
one.23
Th e category of ‘constitutional statutes’ includes any statute which ‘(a) conditions 
the legal relationship between citizen and State in some general, overarching manner, 
or (b) enlarges or diminishes the scope of what we would now regard as fundamental 
constitutional rights’. Any statute not fi tting this description is an ‘ordinary statute’. 
Important examples of constitutional statutes are the Magna Carta of 1215, the Bill 
of Rights 1689 and the Act of Union 1707, but also more recent statutes, such as the 
Human Rights Act 1998, the Scotland Act 1998, the Government of Wales Act 1998 
and the European Communities Act 1972.24 Whilst Th oburn did not touch upon 
19 In addition to the approval by two-thirds majority by both the National Council and the Federal 
Council, a total revision of the constitution would also require a referendum. See Article 44(3) of the 
Federal Constitutional Law.
20 See Article 79(3) GG and Article 23(1) GG (the acronym GG indicates the German Grundgesetz, Basic 
Law). See K.-P. Sommermann, ‘Off ene Staatlichkeit: Deutschland’, in A. von Bogdandy et al.  (eds.), 
Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum (Müller, 2008), p. 17 et seq.
21 See Article  146 GG. Th e notion of ‘constitutional identity’, introduced by the Lisbon Ruling of the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, is criticized by some constitutional law scholars for being 
too vague. See, for example, M. Nettesheim, ‘Wo “endet” das Grundgesetz? – Verfassungsgebung als 
Grenzüberschreitender Prozess’, 51 Der Staat (2012), p. 322 et seq.
22 Th e traditional defi nition of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty can be traced back to A.V. Dicey, 
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th edition, MacMillan, 1959), p. 59.
23 According to the doctrine of implied repeal, if Parliament passes a statute featuring provisions in 
confl ict with an earlier statute, the aff ected part of the earlier statute is impliedly repealed. Th e case 
Th oburn v. Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin) specifi cally concerned the application 
of the doctrine of implied repeal to the European Communities Act 1972. Th is ruling is contested by 
some legal scholars: see for example T. Poole, ‘Questioning Common Law Constitutionalism’, 25 Legal 
Studies (2005), p. 142–163.
24 In the case BH v. Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 24, para. 30, Lord Hope re-stated the ‘fundamental 
constitutional nature’ of the Scotland Act, with the consequence that ‘Its provisions cannot be regarded 
as vulnerable to alteration by implication from some other enactment in which an intention to alter the 
Scotland Act is not set forth expressly on the face of the statute.’
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the constitutional status of the local government, the Localism Act 2011 contains an 
interesting development of the same principle in relation to local government in England. 
Section 2(4) of that Act stipulates that the powers of local authorities are not subjected to 
implied repeal. By contrast, the acts that Th oburn looked at, did not include an explicit 
provision on implied repeal. Indeed, Laws LJ suggested that the constitutional statutes 
are such ‘by force of the common law’.
Th e further question of to what extent (expressly, of course) it is legally possible for 
Parliament to limit (or even to remove) the powers of the local government or devolution 
goes completely to the heart of the constitution in the UK. Whilst politically the abolition 
of the local self-government or of devolution are currently unthinkable, it would appear 
uncertain, to say the least, whether Parliament would be legally authorized to limit their 
powers beyond a certain extent. Such uncertainty demonstrates that even in a fl exible 
constitutional system like the UK, the regional and local self-government are so deeply 
rooted in the ‘constitutional identity’ of the country, that they may even limit the supreme 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty.25
From the preceding overview it is shown that the transfers of powers from the 
Member States to the EU shall be compatible with regional/local autonomy and shall 
not frustrate the fundamental constitutional role of the local and regional authorities in 
accordance with each constitutional system. When the ability of the local and regional 
authorities to perform a minimum ‘hard core’ of essential tasks is undermined, then the 
transfer of powers to the EU or the prevalence of EU law shall not take place. In turn the 
EU, created and shaped by these transfers of powers, shall factor in the existence and role 
of powerful local/regional authorities and has no alternative but to be a ‘Europe with the 
regions and the local authorities’, rather than merely a ‘union of states’. Th is conclusion 
pushes towards the introduction of appropriate arrangements for the involvement of 
these authorities (in reality only of the regions of some Member States) in the decision to 
transfer powers to the EU and, once powers have been transferred, for the involvement 
of both local and regional authorities in the EU decision-making processes concerning 
their responsibilities or interests.
25 If Parliament ever tried to remove local government or devolution or to render them irrelevant, 
almost certainly there would be court cases which would test the courts’ adherence to the principle 
of parliamentary sovereignty. To date, the only case to have suggested (in an obiter dictum) a possible 
willingness of the House of Lords to fi nd certain legislation passed by Parliament to be unlawful is R 
(Jackson) v. Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56. In the case AXA General Insurance v. Lord Advocate 
[2011] UKSC 46, para. 50–51, Lord Hope left  open the question of whether the supremacy of the UK 
Parliament is absolute or may be subject to limitation in exceptional circumstances. On the opinion 
that parliamentary sovereignty is limited vis-à-vis devolution and local government see C. Panara, 
‘Th e contribution of local self-government to constitutionalism in the member states and in the EU 
multilayered system of governance’, in C. Panara and M. Varney (eds.), Local Government in Europe 
(Routledge, 2013), p.  377 et seq., and, more recently and specifi cally in relation to devolution, K. 
Campbell, ‘Th e draft  Scotland Bill and limits in constitutional statutes’, UK Constitutional Law Blog 
(2015), http://ukconstitutionallaw.org. See also M. Varney, ‘Brexit and Welsh Devolution: Th e Likely 
Impact’, forthcoming book chapter (I would like to thank the author for letting me see the manuscript).
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Accordingly, a second strategy to reconcile local/regional autonomy and the growing 
role of the EU is the involvement of the regional and local authorities in the decision 
to transfer powers to the EU. Th e traditional and ‘orthodox’ EU law perspective is that 
the Member States are the sole ‘masters of the Treaties’. Th is is confi rmed by a prima 
facie reading of Article 48 TEU on the procedures for amending the Treaties. However 
the transfer of powers from the national level to the EU could undermine the role of 
the local/regional authorities and alter the constitutional balance between central and 
sub-national government. Th is complexity of the EU multilevel system is addressed 
by certain Member States (Belgium, Germany and Austria in particular) through the 
involvement of the local/regional authorities in diff erent ways in the decisions concerning 
the amendment of the Treaties.
For example, the Belgian Regions and Communities have an important say on the 
transfer to the EU of the exclusive powers they have at the domestic level. A treaty 
concerning these powers can only enter into force in Belgium if the parliaments of all the 
regional entities concerned consent to it. As a result, every sub-state parliament has a right 
of veto regarding the ratifi cation of the treaty by Belgium.26 In Germany, the Länder are 
involved collectively, as a level of government, in the approval of a treaty. An individual 
Land does not have a right of veto. Every new treaty would need to be approved by a 
majority of two thirds in the Bundesrat (the legislative chamber representing the Länder 
at the federal level), as well as in the Bundestag (the democratically elected chamber 
representing the German people).27 Th e German system is similar to the solution 
adopted in Austria, where amendments to the founding Treaties require the approval 
by a majority of two thirds both in the Nationalrat (the chamber representing all the 
Austrian people) and the Bundesrat (the chamber representing the Länder at federal 
level).28
In addition to the ex post involvement of the sub-national authorities in the ratifi cation 
of a new treaty, the Member States may also involve the sub-national level in the work 
of an intergovernmental conference (IGC) or convention leading to a new treaty. Th e 
German Länder sent two representatives as part of the German delegation to the IGC 
that led to the Maastricht Treaty. In this way they contributed to secure the introduction 
26 Th is is a result of the principle in foro interno et in foro externo, which is embedded in Article 167(3) of 
the Belgian Constitution. See A. De Becker, ‘Belgium: Th e State and the Sub-State Entities Are Equal, 
But Is the State Sometimes Still More Equal Th an the Others?’, in C. Panara and A. De Becker (eds.), 
Th e Role of the Regions in EU Governance, p. 256. Mutatis mutandis the Belgian position is similar to 
the Finnish position. According to Chapter 9 of the Act on the Autonomy of Åland (1991/1144), the 
Government of Åland must be informed of negotiations on a treaty impacting on the autonomy of Åland 
and, if necessary, must be given the opportunity to participate in the negotiations (see Section 58). If a 
term of a treaty concerns a matter within the competence of Åland, the Åland Parliament must consent 
to the statute implementing that term in order to have it entering into force in Åland (Section 59).
27 See Article 23(1) GG.
28 See Article  50(1) sub (2) and Article  50(4) Federal Constitutional Law (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz, 
B-VG). See H. Eberhard, ‘Austria: Th e Role of the Länder in a ‘Centralised Federal State’, in C. Panara 
and A. De Becker (eds.), Th e Role of the Regions in EU Governance, p. 219.
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of the principle of subsidiarity, the establishment of the CoR and the opening up of the 
Council to regional representatives. Th is type of involvement is very important given 
that participating in the negotiation of a new treaty could be more eff ective than the 
simple ex post approval (or threat of non-approval) of a treaty already negotiated and 
signed by the national governments.
A third strategy to reconcile local/regional autonomy and the growing role of the EU 
is the involvement of the regional and local authorities in the EU decision-making process 
and in the implementation of EU law and policy as envisaged by the CoR’s White Paper 
on MLG. Th is participation would enable the local and regional authorities to maintain 
and possibly expand their constitutional role of protection of local interests while being 
involved in an unprecedented phenomenon of supranational integration. Th is appears to 
be the correct way to reconcile regional and local autonomy with European integration. 
Local and regional participation in the EU has a key constitutional mission to accomplish 
in the EU context. It is constitutionally envisaged by the Member States (at least by those 
whose constitutional system includes regional and local self-government) and, if and to 
the extent that MLG arrangements refl ect the ‘national identity’ of a Member State, also 
by Union primary law. Th is is an example of how the EU and the national legal orders 
tend to adjust mutually to each other in the context of the European legal system.29
§3. LOCAL AND REGIONAL PARTICIPATION 
AND LEGITIMACY OF EU DECISION-MAKING
From a local and regional perspective, the legitimacy of the EU as a system and of single 
EU decisions depends largely on suitable arrangements for the involvement of local and 
regional authorities in the EU decision-making process, both at the EU and Member 
State levels.30 Th e role of the procedures for local/regional participation in the EU is 
therefore not merely formal, but also substantial, in that these procedures aim to protect 
local and regional self-government as an integral part of the constitutional system of a 
Member State.31
29 On the notion of European public law as a result of the interaction and the mutual exchange between 
the EU and the national legal orders cf. P. Birkinshaw, European Public Law (2nd edition, Kluwer, 2014), 
p. 6 et seq. See also the idea, typical of constitutional pluralism, that the EU and the national legal 
orders shall take into account as far as possible their respective constitutional requirements: cf. in 
particular M. Poiares Maduro, ‘Th ree Claims of Constitutional Pluralism’, in M. Avbelj and J. Komarek 
(eds.), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (OUP, 2012), Ch. 4.
30 On the idea that procedures contribute legitimacy to decisions see, from a sociology of law perspective, 
N. Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren (3rd edition, Suhrkamp, 1978). On procedural frameworks 
in multi-level systems see A. Benz, Politik in Mehrebenensystemen (Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft en, 
2009), p. 205 et seq. On legitimacy in the EU and particularly on the input/output legitimacy distinction 
see F. Scharpf, Governing in Europe. Eff ective and Democratic? (OUP, 1999), p. 6.
31 See the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-151/12 Commission v. Spain, EU:C:2013:354, 
para. 34–35, where Kokott implicitly recognized that the right (and duty) of the Autonomous 
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Th e EU is a complex system of governance where majoritarian and non-majoritarian 
forms of legitimacy are combined together in a variety of ways and complement each 
other, sometimes in a dialectic manner. A train of thought in European studies sees 
the involvement of sub-national authorities in EU law-making and policy-making as 
a form of ‘participatory democracy’.32 Th is concept (like others, such as, deliberative 
democracy) is traditionally acknowledged as being focused on the civic dimension of 
democratic legitimacy rather than on the participation of public authorities, such as 
the local and regional self-governed communities.33 However this notion can be useful 
from an epistemological perspective in that it captures three fundamental elements: 
participation by local/regional communities in EU decision-making; the idea that a 
large number of democratically structured sub-national societies contribute to decision-
making in the EU; the idea that this participation contributes legitimacy to the EU and 
its policies. Th e duty for the Commission to consult widely before proposing legislation 
(Article  2 Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality), the consultation of the CoR 
during the legislative process (Article 307 TFEU), the involvement of sub-state entities 
by the Member States in the formulation of the national position in EU decision-making 
fora, can all be considered atypical forms of participatory democracy. Th ey are described 
as ‘atypical’ because the participants are not individual citizens or organized social 
groups (such as, for example, trade unions, NGOs and so on), but sub-state authorities 
with a democratically representative character.
A sub-national authority is indeed a public authority which is an expression of a 
democratically self-governed territorial community. Accordingly, its choice of priorities 
should be driven by the common good of the community as well and should undergo 
the scrutiny of a democratically representative assembly, such as a regional parliament 
or a local council. If this is the case, it may be argued that regional action at the EU 
level (for example, the lobbying activity of the regional offi  ce) would be democratically 
Communities to participate in the implementation of EU law in the areas falling within their legislative 
responsibility is an essential part of the constitutional identity of the Spanish State. On the key role 
of regulatory frameworks to prevent a loss of democratic legitimacy of decisions see B.G. Peters and 
J. Pierre, in I. Bache and M. Flinders (eds.), Multi-level Governance, p. 89. See also the reference to a 
‘transparent, open and inclusive policy-making process’ in the Charter for MLG in Europe (Point 1.1). 
On ‘substantial legitimacy’ see C. Martínez-Sicluna y Sepúlveda, Legalità e legittimità: la teoria del 
potere (ESI, 2006), p. 220.
32 See S. Mangiameli, ‘Th e Role of Regional and Local Government in European Governance’, in H.-J. 
Blanke and S. Mangiameli (eds.), Governing Europe under a Constitution (Springer, 2006), p. 460–462, 
475–476, 480–481; J. Greenwood, ‘Actors of the Common Interest? Th e Brussels Offi  ces of the Regions’, 
33 Journal of European Integration (2011), p. 437 et seq.; C. Panara, Th e Sub-national Dimension of the 
EU: A Legal Study of Multilevel Governance (Springer, 2015), p. 173. See also the European Parliament 
resolution of 14  January 2003 on the role of regional and local authorities in European integration 
(2002/2141(INI)), at point 4.
33 On participatory democracy see C. Pateman, Participation and Democratic Th eory (Cambridge 
University Press, 1970). See also B.R. Barber, Strong Democracy. Participatory Politics for a New Age 
(2nd edition, University of California Press, 2003).
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legitimated in front of the local community and would constitute a loyal refl ection, a 
projection, of that community at the EU level.
It is possible to identify the following pathways to legitimacy of EU decision-making 
deriving from participation of the sub-national authorities: (i) consultation; (ii) systems 
of coordination to determine the position of the Member States in EU decision-making 
fora (particularly in the Council); (iii) role of the sub-national parliaments in the EU 
decision-making process; (iv) lobbying by regional offi  ces in Brussels; and (v) promotion 
by the sub-national authorities of stakeholders’ and citizens’ participation in the EU.
A. CONSULTATION
Consultation can be mandatory (for example, consultation of the CoR on certain topics 
established by the Treaty), or non mandatory (for example, generic obligation for the 
Commission to consult widely). It can take place at the EU level (for example, Structured 
Dialogue between the Commission and the associations of territorial authorities;34 as 
political dialogue between the Commission and national parliaments including the 
chambers representing the sub-national authorities),35 or at the national level (structured 
forms of consultation with the regional authorities before determining the national position 
of the Member State in the Council, and consultation by the national parliament of regional 
parliaments with legislative powers in the framework of the early warning system;36 and also 
involvement of the local and regional authorities in the preparation and implementation of 
the national reform programmes related to the Agenda 2020 of the Commission).37
Th at proper pre-legislative ‘dialogue’ or ‘consultation’ can contribute democratic 
legitimacy to the EU law-making process is corroborated by the case UEAPME, where 
the Court of First Instance held that whenever the European Parliament does not 
participate in the enactment of a legislative act, the principle of democracy requires 
an alternative form of participation of the people. If such participation takes the form 
of ‘social dialogue’, the Commission and the Council have the obligation to verify 
that the social partners involved are ‘suffi  ciently representative’. Only in this way can 
the democratic legitimacy of the lawmaking process be maintained.38 By analogy, 
34 See Communication from the Commission, COM(2003) 811 fi nal; and Committee of the Regions’ 
Bureau Decision CoR 380/2003 part II of 19 March 2004.
35 Th e political dialogues has been launched by the Barroso Commission in 2006. Th is avenue has been 
used by the German Bundesrat for example in relation to the added value tax directive in 2013.
36 Article 6 of the Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality.
37 See Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth, COM(2010) 2020 fi nal, p.  29. See also the document of the CoR and of the Commission, 
‘Delivering on the Europe 2020 Strategy. Handbook for Local and Regional Authorities’, (2012), p. 13, 
20.
38 Case T-135/96 UEAPME v. Council, EU:T:1998:128, para. 88–89. See S. Smismans, Law, Legitimacy, 
and European Governance (OUP, 2004), p. 343 et seq.; P. Popelier, ‘Governance and Better Regulation: 
Dealing with the Legitimacy Paradox’, 17 European Public Law (2011), p. 567 et seq.
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consultation with the sub-national authorities outside the CoR can create legitimacy 
only if the consultation process is ‘structured’ (that is, based on objective criteria), 
transparent and suffi  ciently inclusive.39 More specifi cally, the Union should identify 
and develop adequate communication channels with the sub-national authorities, for 
example by selecting for the Structured Dialogue, and for any other form of consultation, 
truly representative associations of regional and local authorities, whose internal life is 
organized democratically.40
B. SYSTEMS OF COORDINATION TO DETERMINE THE POSITION 
OF THE MEMBER STATES IN EU DECISION-MAKING FORA 
(PARTICULARLY IN THE COUNCIL)
In a number of Member States there are rules of coordination to decide the position of 
the Member State in EU decision-making fora, for example, to decide the position of 
the Member State before a meeting of the Council. In this way, when an EU proposal 
or policy may have an impact on key regional responsibilities or interests, the position 
of the Member State in these fora will have to incorporate, or at least will have to 
take account of and be informed by, the point of view of the sub-national authorities. 
Coordination mechanisms produce legitimacy if and to the extent that they protect 
eff ectively the constitutional standing of the sub-national authorities. For example, in 
a typical federal state like Germany, when the Council agenda features items falling 
within the exclusive legislative responsibility of the Länder, the Bundesrat (the legislative 
chamber representing the Länder on the national level) can determine the position of 
Germany in the Council. In this way, at least from a German Länder perspective, the EU 
decision-making process is legitimated by the involvement of all the Länder on an equal 
footing and with a real opportunity to contribute eff ectively to the formulation of the 
position of their Member State.41
39 On the importance of consultation in EU lawmaking see Interinstitutional Agreement on Better 
Lawmaking, [2003] OJ C 321/1, point 26.
40 Th e Commission Communication of 19  December 2003 and the Decision of the Bureau of the 
CoR of 19  March 2004 establish that participation in the Structured Dialogue is open to political 
representatives at the highest level of national and European associations of local and regional 
authorities. Th e participant associations are selected by the Commission with the help of the CoR and 
have to match certain criteria, including ‘a wide basis of territorial and democratic representation’ and 
‘the need to keep a fair balance among associations representing diff erent categories of regional and 
local authorities’.
41 On the participation of the German Länder in the EU decision-making process see Article 23(2–6) 
GG. On the diff erent systems of regional participation in the EU see C. Panara and A. De Becker (eds.), 
Th e Role of the Regions in EU Governance, Ch. 6–12. Specifi cally on Germany see C. Panara, ‘In the 
Name of Cooperation: Th e External Relations of the German Länder and Th eir Participation in the EU 
Decision-Making’, 6 European Constitutional Law Review (2010), p. 59 et seq.
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C. THE ROLE OF THE SUB-NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS 
IN THE EU DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Th e role of sub-national parliaments, particularly those with legislative powers, has 
been enhanced not only by the consultation opportunity prompted by the early warning 
system,42 but also by reforms made in recent years by some sub-national authorities 
to strengthen the role of these parliaments vis-à-vis the regional governments. For 
example, in the Land Baden-Württemberg (Germany), in addition to the ordinary rights 
to receive regular information, when an EU proposal focuses primarily on an area of 
exclusive legislative responsibility of the Länder (education, culture, police law, radio/
TV broadcasting), the Landtag (the regional parliament) may impose an imperative 
mandate on the Land government. In such a scenario the Land government would be 
bound to follow the position of the Landtag and to defend that position in the Bundesrat, 
unless the position is in confl ict with substantial Land interests. In this way it enhanced 
the democratic legitimacy of the Land (and indirectly of the whole internal, German) 
EU-related decision-making activity.43
D. LOBBYING BY REGIONAL OFFICES IN BRUSSELS
Over the last 20–25 years a large number of regional and local authorities across the EU 
opened liaison offi  ces in Brussels. Th e main tasks of these offi  ces are the representation 
of the regional/local authority vis-à-vis Union institutions (especially the Commission); 
the promotion of the image and interests of the regional/local authority on the EU level; 
and, fi nally, networking with other players for joint lobbying. Lobbying is important 
for the legitimacy of the Union in that it creates a direct communication channel, 
potentially bi-directional, between the local level and the EU, and insofar as it may 
secure positive results for a locality or a region. However, democracy is inseparably 
linked to the idea of equality of opportunity and lobbying can be problematic from an 
equality perspective; the unequal resources (budget, staff  and so on) available to each 
player, but also the asymmetry of their powers across the Member States, shape in a very 
diff erent and unequal manner the capacity of sub-national players for action in the EU 
political arena. Lobbying, moreover, takes place through informal contacts: outside of 
42 Article 6(1) Subsidiarity Protocol. Th e consultation of the sub-national parliaments during the early 
warning system does not seem to work well in practice due to the little time (six weeks only) for a 
reasoned opinion.
43 See Article 34a(2), second sentence, of the Constitution of the Land Baden-Württemberg. See also §9(2) 
Law on the Involvement of the Landtag in Aff airs of the European Union of 17 February 2011 (Gesetz 
über die Beteiligung des Landtags in Angelegenheiten der EU, EULG in acronym). Th e Landtag uses this 
instrument cum grano salis (i.e. not too oft en). Also other Länder (for example, Bavaria) feature similar 
mechanisms of parliamentary participation in EU matters. Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria are the 
leading Länder for parliament involvement in EU aff airs. See G. Abels, ‘Adapting to Lisbon: Reforming 
the Role of German Landesparlamente in EU Aff airs’, 22 German Politics (2013), p. 1–26.
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formal, largely predictable, transparent procedural patterns. Th is explains why Peters 
and Pierre indicate this type of activity on the EU level as a ‘Faustian bargain’ and see it 
as problematic for democratic legitimacy.44
E. PROMOTION BY THE SUB-NATIONAL AUTHORITIES OF 
STAKEHOLDERS’ AND CITIZENS’ PARTICIPATION IN THE EU
Promotion by the sub-national authorities of stakeholders’ and citizens’ participation 
in the EU may consist of the involvement of public or private players (‘stakeholders’, 
including other sub-national authorities), but also, directly, in the involvement of the 
citizens. For example, the Region Lombardia (Italy) promotes the involvement of the 
local authorities and of other public and private players by informing them about EU 
law and policy and especially by facilitating their participation in EU programmes.45 
An important way to facilitate contact between the regional stakeholders and the EU 
institutions has been the creation of a representation of key economic and social players 
from the regional territory (including, for example, the Conference of the Rectors of 
the Universities of Lombardia; Assolombarda, which is an association of approximately 
5,000 fi rms; Expo2015; the Regional Agency for the Protection of the Environment; the 
Regional Council of Lombardia and so on).
Th e liaison offi  ces in Brussels of some English local authorities are strongly 
‘stakeholder based’ in that they are not solely expression of a sub-national authority, 
but of a group of key local economic, educational and other players. For example, the 
partners of Liverpool City Region Brussels Offi  ce include a wide spectrum of territorial 
authorities (Knowsley MBC), specialized agencies (Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service, 
Merseytravel, Merseyside Recycling and Waste Authority), higher education institutions 
(Liverpool University), organizations with a broader mission (Liverpool City Region LEP, 
Liverpool Vision, Network for Europe). In this way the Liverpool City Region Offi  ce, like 
the Delegation of Lombardia, aims to represent the ‘regional system’ including a variety 
of territorial authorities, specialized agencies, research institutions and economic players.
An important example of direct involvement of the citizens by the sub-national 
authorities is the use made by the Land Baden-Württemberg of the European Citizens’ 
Initiative (ECI). In 2013 the Land Baden-Württemberg played a key role in promoting the 
fi rst successful ECI calling on the Commission to ensure aff ordable and non-privatized 
access to water for all EU citizens (Right2Water).
At this stage it is important to highlight that the described mechanisms of local 
and regional participation in the EU perform overall an important function especially 
44 B.G. Peters and J. Pierre, in I. Bache and M. Flinders (eds.), Multi-level Governance, p. 86. On equality 
of opportunity in multi-level political systems see A. Benz, Politik in Mehrebenensystemen, p. 214 et seq.
45 See Article 11(2) of Lombardia Law No. 17 of 21 November 2011. On the involvement of these players in 
the annual ‘EU session’ of the Lombardia Regional Council see Article 3(2) of Lombardia Law No. 17 of 
21 November 2011.
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in terms of legitimacy. Th ey legitimize the EU decision-making process in that they 
enhance the democratic quality of that decision-making and of the internal processes 
within the Member States. However, the ‘intensity’ of these participation tools in terms 
of their ability to shape EU policies and laws is questionable, even though this quantity 
is diffi  cult or nearly impossible to measure objectively and precisely (how to measure 
the eff ectiveness of lobbying by the sub-national authorities? And the impact of the CoR 
in the decision-making process?46 And the impact of consultation more in general?). 
It is arguable that consultation at national and EU level in its various forms might not 
be a particularly ‘strong’ form of participation. However it is probable that the picture 
would be slightly diff erent if we looked at the preparatory procedures in certain Member 
States (Belgium, Germany, Austria, Spain), where the position of the Member State 
in the Council can be determined by the regional authorities. Still, this is not always 
and everywhere the case and explains why a large number of regional authorities from 
federal and regional countries, but also of territorial authorities from traditionally more 
centralized systems (such as, the UK and France), try to escape the constraints arising 
from the ‘gatekeeper role’ of the central government by resorting to direct contacts with 
the EU institutions (lobbying).
At the same time it needs to be taken into account that most tools at national and EU 
level are available to ‘regional’ authorities rather than to ‘local’ authorities (namely sub-
regional), although also this second group of authorities plays an important role at EU 
and national levels. Accordingly, an evaluation of the eff ectiveness of the various tools 
needs to take account of a triple asymmetry: between consultation and stronger forms of 
involvement (currently not available at the EU level, only one at the national level in some 
Member States); between the Member States, which feature multifarious mechanisms 
of regional and local involvement with various degrees of strength (in some Member 
States the regions can determine the position of the Member State in the Council); and 
fi nally between regional authorities and ‘other’ sub-national authorities within the same 
Member State.
§4. THE PROBLEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY
A system of governance based on constitutionalism requires that the decision-makers 
are accountable for their actions. Quite correctly Adam Cygan observes that the Treaty 
of Lisbon, whilst trying to recognize a greater role of the regions in EU lawmaking, has 
failed to establish appropriate mechanisms for their accountability in circumstances 
when they misapply EU law.47 However in a number of Member States this issue is 
46 On the diffi  culty to measure the impact of the CoR in the decision-making process see E. Domorenok, 
19 Regional & Federal Studies (2009), p. 143 et seq.
47 A. Cygan, ‘Regional Governance, Subsidiarity and Accountability within the EU’s Multi-Level Polity’, 
19 European Public Law (2013), p. 188.
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dealt with at national level. In Konle and Haim the CJEU recognized that State liability 
may be triggered by an action or a failure to act of a sub-state entity (‘a part of the 
State’). In such circumstances the federation or the central government should not 
necessarily make the reparation of the damage or the loss. Th is can be made by the 
responsible sub-state entity in accordance with domestic law.48 In this manner the 
CJEU ‘legitimized’ the national legislation imposing exclusively on sub-national 
authorities the responsibility for a ‘loss’ or ‘damage’ attributable to a component of the 
Member State.
In some Member States there is a subsidiary fi nancial liability of the sub-national 
authorities towards the Member State, which fi nds application in the event of a breach of 
EU obligations originating from the behaviour of a sub-state authority. Such arrangements 
aim to work as a deterrent against failures to implement, inaccurate implementation, 
or any other breach of obligations deriving from EU membership. Germany is a good 
example of this approach. Any cost deriving from Germany’s violation of ‘supranational’ 
or ‘international’ obligations must be borne by the responsible Land or Länder in 
proportion to the respective quota of responsibility.49
Similar criteria fi nd application in other Member States, too. Austrian law lays 
down the obligation for the Länder and the local authorities to pay the costs which 
derive from judgments of the CJEU in relation to breaches of EU law.50 Any disputes 
on the attribution of the fi nancial liability to the sub-state authorities are decided by the 
Constitutional Court (see Article 137 Federal Constitutional Law). In a similar manner 
in Spain the Constitutional Tribunal (Tribunal Constitucional) has held that when an 
Autonomous Community does not implement EU law correctly in an area within its 
responsibility, that Community shall comply with the fi ndings of the CJEU and pay any 
fi ne.51 In the UK too, when a breach of EU obligations originates from the behaviour 
of one of the devolved authorities in Scotland, Northern Ireland or Wales, or of a local 
authority, the responsible entity may be required to pay the pecuniary sanction imposed 
on the UK.52 A comparable ‘right of redress’ through which the central government can 
48 See Case C-302/97 Konle v. Austria, EU:C:1999:271, para. 61–64; Case C-424/97 Haim v. 
Kassenzahnärtztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein, EU:C:2000:357, para. 31–32. See P. Craig and G. De 
Bùrca, EU Law – Text, Cases and Materials (6th edition, OUP, 2015), p. 254.
49 See Article 104a(6), fi rst subparagraph, GG.
50 See 2008 Financial Equalization Act (Finanzausgleichsgesetz 2008, FAG 2008), BGBl. I 2007/103.
51 See Ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court No. 79 of 28 May 1992 and later judgments.
52 In relation to devolved administrations see Section B4.26 of the Concordat on Co-ordination of EU 
Policy Issues. In relation to local authorities see Part 2 and Part 3 of the Localism Act 2011.
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recover any expenditure deriving from the non-fulfi lment of EU obligations also exists 
in Italy,53 Belgium54 and the Netherlands.55
In summary, from a traditional orthodox EU perspective, only the state is responsible 
for a breach of EU obligations, but from an internal/constitutional perspective the sub-
national authority which causes fi nancial liability of the state or state liability may have to 
pay the fi ne or the ‘loss’ or ‘damage’. Th e subsidiary fi nancial liability of the sub-national 
authorities is anchored to the national constitution (Germany, Spain), or is entrenched 
in rules of constitutional signifi cance – rules aff ecting the constitutional autonomy of 
the sub-national authorities (this is the case for all the other analysed case studies). Th is 
confi rms that the EU multilevel system is far more complicated and articulated than just 
a linear national-supranational relationship between Member States and the EU.
Accountability, however, does not apply only to misapplications of EU law. It embraces 
more in general the idea, typical of democratic constitutionalism, that decision-makers 
shall be accountable for what they decide to the point that they can be removed from 
offi  ce if their action is judged to be unsatisfactory by voters. If and to what extent local 
and regional representatives playing a role at the EU level are accountable to a local 
assembly is a problem of sub-national constitutional law. Carolyn Rowe considers this 
issue in relation to the regional offi  ces in Brussels and puts forward a divide between 
‘constitutional regions’ (for example the German Länder) and ‘administrative regions’ 
(for example the English local authorities). She suggests that in the regions of the fi rst 
group there are adequate accountability mechanisms for the offi  ces. In the regions of the 
second group accountability ultimately depends on the arrangements established within 
each local authority, including whether the offi  ce represents a single local authority, 
a number of authorities or it is ‘subscriber-based’ and therefore includes both local 
authorities and other public or private stakeholders.56 Arguably a failure in the chain of 
accountability at local level would reverberate negatively and be problematic on local/
regional participation and particularly on the contribution of legitimacy to the EU 
decision-making process.
53 See Article 43(2) Law No. 234 of 24 December 2012. Article 43(10) of the same Law establishes that the 
State has a similar ‘right of redress’ against the sub-state authorities responsible of a violation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Both provisions were originally introduced in 2007.
54 See Article 16(3) of the Special Act of 8 August 1980.
55 See Statute of 24  May 2012 on the correct application of European law by public authorities (Wet 
Naleving Europese regelgeving publieke entiteiten), Staatsblad 2012, 245. See C. Backes and W. van der 
Woude, ‘Th e Netherlands – Local authorities in the Polder-Dutch municipalities and provinces’, in C. 
Panara and M. Varney (eds.), Local Government in Europe. Th e ‘ fourth level’ in the EU multilayered 
system of governance (Routledge, 2013), p. 252.
56 See C. Rowe, Regional Representations in the EU: Between Diplomacy and Interest Mediation (Palgrave-
MacMillan, 2011), Ch. 6, p.  205–206. See also J. Greenwood, ‘Actors of the Common Interest? Th e 
Brussels Offi  ces of the Regions’, 33 Journal of European Integration (2011), p. 437 et seq.; J. Greenwood, 
‘Th e regional offi  ces in Brussels. From “push and pull” to “people and place”’, 4 Regions and Cohesion 
(2014), p. 1 et seq.
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§5. THE POWER-LIMITING FUNCTION OF SUB-NATIONAL 
PARTICIPATION
Th e domestic and EU arrangements concerning local and regional participation in EU 
processes produce the result of limiting the powers of both national governments and 
Union institutions. Th e political complexity generated by these arrangements, with its 
array of procedural, but also of substantive obligations, plays a role in contributing to 
the fundamental mission of constitutionalism of regulating, tying and ultimately legally 
limiting the exercise of power.57 Th ese arrangements limit power in four fundamental 
ways: (i) by obliging Union institutions and national authorities to comply with certain 
procedural requirements; (ii) by preserving the vertical separation of powers between 
national and sub-national governments; (iii) by infl uencing or determining the substance 
of the action of Union institutions and of domestic authorities; and fi nally (iv) by breaking 
the traditional state monopoly in the fi eld of external relations.
(i) By obliging the Union institutions and the domestic authorities to comply with 
certain procedural requirements (that is, by determining how a certain decision 
has to be adopted), the point of view of the sub-national authorities in relation 
to certain policy issues is fed to the Union institutions (although these are not 
necessarily obliged to take it on board). Such procedural requirements are in place 
both at the EU and the national level. At the EU level there are the compulsory 
(albeit nonbinding) opinions of the CoR.58 Furthermore there is the duty for 
the Commission to consult widely before making legislative proposals (Article 2 
Subsidiarity Protocol) and there are instruments such as the structured dialogue 
and the political dialogue.59 Finally, there is the early warning system which may 
57 Th e crucial power-limiting function of constitutionalism is highlighted by C.H. McIlwain, 
Constitutionalism, p. 9.
58 See Article 304(1) TFEU. Th e eff ectiveness of the opinions of the CoR is diffi  cult to evaluate. According 
to some accounts this is limited: see, inter alia, D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, European Union 
Law (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 90. However, while conducting research for 
other (still ongoing) studies, the author of this article found evidence of diff erent views among regional 
lobbyists and representatives. Some regional lobbyists (for example, from Cornwall and Liverpool City 
Region, UK) prefer to deal with the other EU institutions directly rather than with the CoR due to its 
limited infl uence. Other lobbyists highlight the importance of the CoR in order to promote the image 
of a region and for networking purposes (for example, Lombardia, Italy). Finally, a few lobbyists and 
local politicians, especially from localities and regions with an own representative in the CoR (for 
example, Baden-Württemberg, Germany, and Greater Manchester, UK), highlight that (also) through 
the CoR they can play a role in EU decision-making.
59 On the structured dialogue see Communication of the Commission, COM(2003) 811 fi nal; and the 
CoR’s Bureau Decision CoR 380/2003 part II of 19  March 2004. Th e structured dialogue consists 
of regular meetings hosted by the CoR between the Commission and the European and national 
associations of sub-national authorities (these are selected by the Commission with the assistance of the 
CoR). Th ese meetings may concern issues of broad interest, such as the annual work programme of the 
Commission (general dialogue), or a specifi c policy area (thematic dialogue). On the political dialogue 
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concern the sub-national authorities if these are represented in one of the chambers 
of the national parliament (for example, the German Bundesrat). It may concern the 
sub-national authorities also where there are eff ective mechanisms in place at the 
national level for the involvement of regional parliaments with legislative powers in 
the early warning system (Article 6(1) Subsidiarity Protocol).
 At the national level there are domestic processes for regional/local involvement 
in formulating the national position during the EU decision-making process (see 
above). Th ere are also domestic processes to enforce compliance with the obligations 
stemming from the EU, such as substitute powers of the national government, 
which in turn need to abide by a certain procedure. Th e exercise of substitute 
powers is an exception to the normal constitutional allocation of powers. Th erefore, 
in order to respect the decentralized, federal or regional structure of the state, the 
substitution procedures must be inspired by principles such as loyal cooperation, 
respect for regional and local autonomy, and proportionality. For example, in Italy 
the substitution procedure takes account of the constitutional rights of the Regions. 
Th e national government has to establish a proper timescale within which the 
Region shall act, and only in case of a failure to act (or of inadequate action) will the 
government enact the required measure. Th e Head of the Executive of the Region 
has the right to participate in the session of the Council of Ministers deciding on the 
substitute measure, which shall be limited to what is ‘necessary’ (proportionality).60
(ii) In federal and regional states, in addition to a horizontal division of powers 
(legislative, executive, judiciary), there is a vertical separation of powers between 
central and local/regional governments. An excessive weakening of the latter would 
undermine this separation and eventually the democratic system established by the 
state constitution. Th e participation rights of the sub-national authorities in the 
promulgation of EU law/policy are designed to compensate for the loss of powers 
these authorities have suff ered as a result of European integration. Also the right/
duty of the local/regional authorities to implement and give execution to EU law/
policy in the framework of their remit and territory is linked to the need to protect 
the constitutional role of these entities.
(iii) Th e action of the EU and of the national governments is not only procedurally, but 
also substantively limited, in order to ensure protection to the local and regional 
authorities. At the EU level substantive limitations include the duty for the EU to 
see Commission Communication on a citizens’ agenda – Delivering results for Europe, COM(2006) 
211. Th e political dialogue takes place between the Commission and the national parliaments. It 
concerns the sub-national authorities in those Member States in which they are represented directly 
in one of the chambers of the national parliament. Th e political dialogue is used as a communication 
channel particularly by the German Bundesrat on behalf of the Länder.
60 See Article of 8 Law No. 131 of 5 June 2003. On the EU-related substitute powers of central governments 
vis-à-vis local and regional authorities in Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the UK 
see C. Panara and A. De Becker, in C. Panara and A. De Becker (eds.), Th e Role of the Regions in EU 
Governance, p. 336 et seq.
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respect the national identity of the Member States, and particularly the regional 
and local self-government (Article 4(2) TEU). Th is implies a positive duty for the 
EU institutions to involve the local and regional authorities in policy-making 
in a number of ways: through consultation with these authorities; through the 
adoption of methods of governance which value the contribution of local and 
regional authorities; through various forms of ‘dialogue’ with the sub-national 
authorities and their associations; through the introduction of ad hoc funding 
streams and programmes for local and regional authorities; and through the 
recognition of the role of the CoR in the institutional architecture of the EU. Th is 
also implies the duty for the EU to pay particular attention to the local and regional 
authorities by introducing and using appropriate tools for their involvement, from 
tripartite contracts, to special forms of partnership, from the macro-regions to the 
valuation of localities through, for example, the protection of typical products, the 
denomination of origin of products and the protection of languages of regional 
minorities. An expansive construction of Article 4(2) TEU, which would exploit the 
full potential of this Treaty provision, may also embrace the introduction of future 
Treaty reforms leading, for instance, to a stronger role, not merely advisory, of the 
CoR in the European architecture and to the recognition of privileged applicant 
status to the sub-state authorities.
 Substantive limitations also include the duty for the EU to comply with the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality (Article 5(3) and (4) TEU) and the prohibition 
of ultra vires action by the EU to protect the national and sub-national autonomy 
(Article 5(2) TEU). Th e enforcement of subsidiarity and proportionality is not a task 
of the CJEU only. Except for exceptional and unlikely cases of clear abuses of power 
or manifest errors by the EU, it is unlikely that the CJEU will strike down legislation 
passed by the EU for a breach of these principles. In most situations full compliance 
with subsidiarity and proportionality is likely to be channelled by various forms 
of ex ante political dialogue and cooperation, from the early warning system to 
the consultative activity of the CoR, from the structured dialogue and the political 
dialogue to various other forms of cooperation and consultation with national and 
sub-national players, including local and regional authorities.61
 At the national level, there is the fundamental duty for the Member State to create 
appropriate forms of regional and/or local involvement in the formulation of the 
national position in the EU as required by its own national constitutional system. 
Th ere is also a duty, stemming from EU secondary law, to abide by the ‘principle of 
MLG’ in the creation and operation of partnerships with the sub-national authorities 
61 See C. Panara, ‘Th e Enforceability of Subsidiarity in the EU and the Ethos of Cooperative Federalism: 
A Comparative Law Perspective’, 22 European Public Law (2016), forthcoming. An earlier attempt to 
link national identity with subsidiarity (although not with regard to local or regional autonomy) can be 
seen in B. Guastaferro, ‘Coupling national identity with subsidiarity concerns in national parliaments’ 
reasoned opinions’, 21 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2014), p. 320 et seq.
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and other economic and social actors in the context of the EU economic, social and 
territorial cohesion policy in accordance with Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013.62 
Th e same fundamental idea that local and regional authorities shall be involved 
in EU policy-making is refl ected in the Agenda 2020 of the Commission63 and in 
the related Handbook created by the CoR and the Commission for the local and 
regional authorities.64
(iv) Th e participation rights of the sub-national authorities in the EU decision-making 
process introduce a limit to the power of the national governments in the external 
arena. Regional and local participation in the EU brings to the fore multiple political 
arenas and players located within the Member States. It leads to variable, wider and 
cross-cutting coalitions (‘geometrie variabili’)65 along asymmetrical territorial and 
economic cleavages. Oft en these coalitions see the sub-national authorities from 
a Member State pursuing at the EU level political goals that are diff erent from the 
respective national government.66 Local and regional participation concerns both 
the EU law-making process (secondary and tertiary law) and (but only in some 
Member States, such as, Belgium, Germany and Austria) the Treaty-making process 
(EU primary law; see above).
Overall the involvement of local/regional authorities in EU related processes has the 
eff ect of limiting the powers of central authorities (both EU and national) and pushes 
towards the establishment of forms of cooperative federalism or regionalism at national 
and EU level. Cooperative federalism or regionalism promotes proximity to the citizen 
by pushing towards the involvement in central decision-making of various players at 
diff erent levels (EU institutions, national or regional parliaments and governments, and 
potentially other territorial stakeholders). Th is outcome is due to the fact that national 
62 Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17  December 
2013 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European 
Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the 
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and 
Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, [2013] OJ L 347/320.
63 See Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth, COM(2010) 2020 fi nal, p. 6, 29.
64 See CoR and Commission, Delivering on the Europe 2020 Strategy – Handbook for Local and Regional 
Authorities (CoR, 2012), https://portal.cor.europa.eu/europe2020/sitecollectiondocuments/europe%20
2020%20handbook%20for%20local%20and%20regional%20authorities.pdf, p. 13, 20. In particular at 
p. 20 the handbook makes reference to MLG as a method of governance.
65 In the Italian political jargon the phrase ‘geometrie variabili’ indicates that parliamentary and party 
political majorities and coalitions may vary in relation to the diff erent issues on the agenda.
66 For example, the Merseyside Brussels Offi  ce (MBO), along with other regional and national players 
from across the EU, lobbied the Union institutions for the introduction of the category ‘transition 
regions’ in the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) Objective 1 for the 2014–2020 period, 
without the support of the UK government. Th e transition regions are those whose GDP is between 75% 
and 90% of the average EU GDP.
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governments keep a ‘gatekeeper role’ and ‘coordinate’, ‘channel’ or ‘manage’ regional 
and/or local participation in the EU in a variety of ways. Th e ‘dual federalism or 
regionalism’ alternative would be viable only if the Member States renounced largely or 
entirely to their gatekeeper role and allowed a generalized ‘going solo’ by the sub-national 
authorities at the EU level (essentially the autonomous representation of the regions 
in the Council of the EU). However, this would imply the end or an unprecedented 
weakening of the nation-state within the EU. Accordingly cooperative federalism 
or regionalism is the solution adopted by all Member States despite their diff erent 
strategies concerning the involvement of the sub-national authorities in the EU.67 For 
a long time scholars have defi ned the multilevel participation which is typical of the 
EU multilevel polity as ‘double political entanglement’ (‘doppelte Politikverfl echtung’) 
in that the hands of the national decision-makers are oft en tied, both in relation to 
national and EU matters.68
§6. THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND DOMESTIC 
COURTS
A. THE ROLE OF THE CJEU
Th e traditional notion of constitutionalism as a ‘legal limitation on government’69 
highlights the role of the judiciary in ensuring obedience to the legal limitations 
on the exercise of power.70 Th is is important for the creation of a balanced, limited, 
legitimate and ultimately ‘good government’ within the EU. Th e CJEU can enforce 
and protect the rights of local and regional authorities in the EU fundamentally in 
two ways: (i) when adjudicating on ‘national identity’ (Article 4(2) TEU), subsidiarity 
(Article  5(3) TEU) and closeness (Article  10(2) TEU); and when adjudicating on 
procedural failures concerning (ii) lack of consultation of the CoR or (iii) the early 
warning system.
67 On the concept of cooperative federalism see A. Reposo, Profi li dello Stato autonomico. Federalismo e 
regionalismo (2nd edition, Giappichelli, 2005), p. 119 et seq. See also G. Bognetti, ‘Federalismo’, Digesto 
delle discipline pubblicistiche, Vol. VI (UTET, 1994), p. 273 et seq.; and G. De Vergottini, ‘Stato federale’, 
Enciclopedia del diritto, Vol. XLIII (Giuff rè, 1990), p. 831 et seq.
68 See R. Hrbek, ‘Doppelte Politikverfl echtung: Deutscher Föderalismus und Europäische Integration. 
Die deutschen Länder im EG-Entscheidungsprozeß’, in R. Hrbek and U. Th aysen (eds.), Die Deutschen 
Länder und die Europäischen Gemeinschaft en (Nomos, 1986), p. 17 et seq. More recently see C. Panara, 
‘In the Name of Cooperation: Th e External Relations of the German Länder and Th eir Participation in 
the EU Decision-Making’, 6 European Constitutional Law Review (2010), p. 59 et seq. On the concept 
of ‘Politikverfl echtung’ see F.W. Scharpf et al., Politikverfl ecthung: Th eorie und Empirie des kooperativen 
Foederalismus in der Bundesrepublik (Scriptor, 1976).
69 C.H. McIlwain, Constitutionalism, p. 21.
70 N. Matteucci, Breve storia del costituzionalismo, p. 91.
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(i) Th e CJEU has never annulled an act for an infringement of national identity71 
or of subsidiarity in relation to local and regional self-government,72 nor for an 
infringement of closeness.73 Th e potential of these principles has not yet been fully 
exploited by the Union and the most appropriate way to implement them is probably 
through forms of cooperation between the diff erent levels of government rather 
than judicially.74 Still, the CJEU has a power of judicial review which embraces 
these principles and their enforcement and things may change in the future along 
with the awareness that the local and regional authorities are an integral part of the 
constitutional system of the EU.
(ii) Th e lack of consultation of the CoR, when this is compulsory, could lead to the 
invalidation of the relevant act by the CJEU. Th e CoR itself could request the 
annulment through a direct action pursuant to Article 263(3) TFEU.
(iii) Failure by the EU institutions to comply with the procedural requirements of the 
early warning system (for example, failure to take into account a ‘yellow’ or an 
‘orange card’) may lead to the annulment of an act by the CJEU. As increasingly 
recognized by scholars, subsidiarity has a ‘procedural’ dimension concerning how 
an act has been adopted, as well as a ‘substantive’ dimension concerning the content 
of an act.75 Accordingly, a claim based on a procedural failure relating to the 
71 Among the cases where the protection aff orded to local and regional authorities by Article 4(2) TEU 
comes to the fore see: Case C-156/13 Digibet Ltd and Gert Albers v. Westdeutsche Lotterie GmbH & Co. 
OHG, EU:C:2014:1756, para. 34, where the CJEU said that ‘the division of competences between the 
[German] Länder cannot be called into question, since it benefi ts from the protection conferred by 
Article 4(2) TEU’; Case C-202/11 Anton Las v. PSA Antwerp NV, EU:C:2013:239, para. 26, where the 
Court recognized that the national identity of a Member State includes the protection of all the offi  cial 
languages of that State; Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Case C-202/11 Anton Las v. PSA 
Antwerp NV, EU:C:2012:456, para. 59; Case T-453/10 Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and 
Rural Development v. Commission, EU:T:2012:106, para. 36–38, where the General Court dismissed the 
argument that the lack of recognition of locus standi to Northern Ireland goes against the obligation 
for the EU to respect the national identity of the UK.
72 Th e literature on subsidiarity is huge. For an up to date summary of the case-law and of the literature 
see C. Panara, Th e Sub-national Dimension of the EU: A Legal Study of Multilevel Governance (Springer, 
2015), p. 79 et seq.
73 So far the Court of Justice has never pronounced on closeness. Occasionally this principle has been 
referred to by the Advocates General. See the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-28/08 
P Commission v. Bavarian Lager Co. Ltd, EU:C:2009:624, para. 212; Opinion of Advocate General 
Fennelly in Joined Cases C-376/98 Germany v. Parliament and Council, Case C-74/99 Th e Queen v. 
Secretary of State for Health, EU:C:2000:324, para. 133; Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Case 
C-428/07 Mark Horvath v. Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Aff airs, EU:C:2009:47, 
para. 93.
74 See C. Panara, 22 European Public Law (2016), forthcoming.
75 See, among many, A. D’Atena, Diritto regionale (Giappichelli, 2010), p. 183; M. Nettesheim, ‘Subsidiarität 
durch politische Verhandlung – Art. 5 Abs. 3 EUV als entmaterialisierte Verfahrensnorm’, in D. König 
and D. Uwer (eds.), Grenzen europäischer Normgebung (Bucerius Law School Press, 2014), p. 35 et seq. 
See also C. Panara, Th e Sub-national Dimension of the EU, p. 79 et seq. Interestingly, in a recent Opinion 
concerning the alleged breach of subsidiarity by the introduction by the Union of an obligatory 
maximum fi xed ratio of 100% of fi xed salary for variable remuneration of bank managers, Advocate 
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early warning system can be instigated, among others, by a chamber of a national 
parliament representing regional and/or local authorities or by the CoR. Pursuant 
to the Subsidiarity Protocol any national parliament, or ‘any chamber thereof ’, is 
entitled to require the respective Member State to ‘notify’ on their behalf an action 
for annulment of EU legislative acts on grounds of an infringement of subsidiarity.76 
Th e expression ‘any chamber thereof ’ includes also the national legislative houses 
which represent local and/or regional authorities (for example, the German 
Bundesrat, the French Senate and so on). Th e Protocol also grants the CoR the right 
to challenge an EU legislative act, for the adoption of which the consultation of the 
CoR is mandatory, on grounds of an infringement of subsidiarity.77
B. THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS
Th ere are essentially two ways in which domestic courts can protect the participation 
rights of local and regional authorities: (i) directly, through the enforcement of the right 
of local and regional authorities to implement EU legislation and of the participation 
rights established by national law; and (ii) indirectly, through the constitutional review 
of the arrangements for local and regional participation in domestic processes linked to 
the EU.
(i) Th e EU shall not alter the allocation of responsibilities between diff erent levels of 
government which is in place in a Member State (institutional and procedural autonomy 
principle)78 and national courts play an important role in ensuring that implementation 
of EU law/policy follows the internal allocation of responsibilities between national 
and sub-national authorities. Th e Austrian Constitutional Court created the notion of 
‘doppelte Bindung’ (double bond). Th e domestic legislator is ‘bound twice’: on the one 
hand, it has to comply with EU obligations and, on the other, with the norms of the national 
constitution, including those concerning the distribution of responsibilities between 
Federation and Länder. Th e consequence is that the Länder have the constitutional 
right and, at the same time, the duty, to implement EU law/policy within their sphere of 
responsibility and territory.79 Even in the UK, where certain arrangements concerning 
General Jääskinen says that: ‘Subject to respecting procedural requirements, the legislature possesses 
a wide margin of discretion when assessing whether a Union measure adheres to the principles of 
proportionality and subsidiarity’ (emphasis added). See Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in 
Case C-507/13 UK v. European Parliament and Council, EU:C:2014:2394, para. 100.
76 See Article 8(1) Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality.
77 See Article 8(2) Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality.
78 See Joined Cases 51–54/71 International Fruit Company NV and others v. Produktschap voor Groenten 
en Fruit, EU:C:1971:128. In the literature see G. Guillermin, ‘Le principe de l’équilibre institutionnel 
dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes’, 119 Journal de Droit 
International (1992), p. 319 et seq.
79 See Rulings of the Austrian Constitutional Court published in Erkentnisse und Beschlüsse des 
Verfassungsgerichtshofes (VfSlg.) 14.863/1997 and 17.022/2003. However, if, pursuant to Article 258 et 
seq. TFEU, the CJEU fi nds that an Austrian Land failed to comply with an obligation under EU law, 
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devolution are binding in honour only,80 in case of a disagreement between the UK 
government and the devolved governments over whether a particular issue falls within 
a devolved competence or is retained by the Westminster Parliament, the dispute might 
be referred to the UK Supreme Court.81 Confl icts may arise in this fi eld. Th e Italian 
Constitutional Court stated that an alteration of the normal distribution of competences 
between state and region may exceptionally be justifi ed if an EU regulation is such to 
require uniform implementation across the entire national territory.82
If arrangements for local or regional participation established by domestic law are 
not observed, sub-national (or national) authorities could typically request a court 
to decide on the matter. For example, the constitutional participation rights of the 
German Länder are judicially enforceable before the Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht; FCC).83 In 1995, the FCC found that the Federal Government 
had not respected the participation rights of the Bundesrat in relation to the adoption 
of Directive 89/522/EEC on TV. Th e FCC held that this behaviour was in breach of the 
principle of federal loyalty.84 However, this declaration did not result, nor could it, in 
the invalidity of the Directive. Admittedly, the lack of invalidity of the fi nal EU act may 
undermine the eff ectiveness of the judicial intervention.
(ii) When assessing the constitutionality of the arrangements created by the 
Member States to protect the autonomy of the sub-national authorities in the context 
of the EU (for example, mandatory consultation of regional authorities by the national 
government prior to Council meetings), constitutional courts can evaluate whether 
these arrangements are consistent with the constitutional concept of regional and local 
autonomy.
C. A GAP IN THE JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF LOCAL 
AND REGIONAL AUTHORITIES
Th e courts of the CJEU do not recognize the status of privileged applicant for local 
and regional authorities in the direct challenge of EU acts under Article 263 TFEU.85 
the competence to adopt the necessary measures, including laws, passes temporarily to the Federation 
(substitute power, see Article 23d(5), fi nal sentence B-VG). See H. Eberhard, in C. Panara and A. De 
Becker (eds.), Th e Role of the Regions in EU Governance, p. 229 et seq.
80 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and Supplementary Agreements Between the UK Government, 
the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers, and the Northern Ireland Executive Committee (September 
2012).
81 See Paragraph B4.9 of the Concordat on the Co-ordination of European Union Policy (September 
2012).
82 See Ruling No. 126 of 24 April 1996.
83 See Article 93(1), No. 1 and No. 3 GG.
84 See Ruling of 22 March 1995.
85 See, ex multis, Case 222/83 Municipality of Diff erdange v. Commission, EU:C:1984:266, para. 8; Case 
C-95/97 Région Wallonne v. Commission, EU:C:1997:184, para. 6–7. See Case C-180/97 Regione Toscana 
v. Commission, EU:C:1997:451, para. 7–8; Case T-214/95 Vlaams Gewest v. Commission, EU:T:1998:77, 
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Th is position leaves a considerable gap in the judicial protection of the prerogatives 
of sub-national authorities in the EU, which is not overcome by the judicial remedies 
available pursuant to Article  267 TFEU (preliminary rulings) and Article  277 TFEU 
(inapplicability).86 More eff ective ways to fi ll this gap have been developed at the domestic 
level through the creation of tools enabling the regional authorities, individually (like in 
Belgium87) or collectively (like Italy and Germany),88 to oblige the own Member State 
to fi le an action for direct annulment before the CJEU pursuant to Article 263 TFEU.89
§7. CONCLUDING REMARKS – TOWARDS A GOOD SYSTEM 
OF LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE EU
Th is analysis has shown that local and regional authorities contribute in a variety of 
ways to constitutionalism in the EU atypical multilevel polity. Th is system of governance 
refl ects fundamental principles and values of European constitutionalism. Certainly 
there is a normative value in promoting and enhancing local and regional participation 
in the EU. Th is is grounded in the constitutional DNA of most Member States and, 
particularly aft er the Treaty of Lisbon, also of the EU.
Th e references to the sub-national level in the Treaty are limited and their potential 
has not yet been entirely exploited (see in particular the principle of subsidiarity and the 
‘national identity’ of Article 4(2) TEU). Still, the ‘Europe with the regions and the local 
authorities’ that has been outlined above, performs an important function for the EU in 
that it reconciles European integration with domestic constitutional laws; enhances the 
para. 28. On this topic see A. Th ies, ‘Th e Locus Standi of the Regions Before EU Courts’, in C. Panara 
and A. De Becker (eds.), Th e Role of the Regions in EU Governance, p. 25 et seq. State aid is an area in 
which the CJEU normally recognizes the locus standi of sub-national authorities. See ibid., p. 29.
86 See C. Panara and A. De Becker, ‘Th e Role of the Regions in the European Inion: Th e “Regional 
Blindness” of Both the EU and the Member States’, in C. Panara and A. De Becker (eds.), Th e Role of 
the Regions in EU Governance, p. 326. See also K. Lenaerts and N. Cambien, ‘Regions and the European 
Court: giving shape to the regional dimension of the Member States’, 16 European Law Review (2010), 
p.  609–635; A. Cygan, ‘Th e Regions within Multilevel Governance: Enhanced Opportunities for 
Improved Accountability?’, 21 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2014), p. 276–
279.
87 See Cooperation Agreement of 11  July 1994. Th e duty for the State Government to bring an action 
before the Court of Justice applies only to EU acts involving exclusive responsibilities of a Community 
or a Region.
88 See Article  5(2) Law No. 131 of 5  June 2003 (Italy) and §7(1) of the Law of 12  March 1993 on the 
cooperation of Federation and Länder in EU related matters (EUZBLG, Germany). Th e Federal 
Government of Germany may refuse to bring the action on grounds of its ‘responsibility for the whole 
state’, including concerns of ‘foreign, defence, and [European] integration policy’.
89 On the diff erent national systems see C. Panara and A. De Becker, in C. Panara and A. De Becker 
(eds.), Th e Role of the Regions in EU Governance, p. 326 et seq. See also the comprehensive comparative 
overview by A. Gamper, ‘Regions and Constitutional Courts in a Multilayered Europe’, in P. Popelier, 
A. Mazmanyan and W. Vandenbruwaene (eds.), Th e Role of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel 
Governance, p. 105 et seq.
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legitimacy of Union’s action and of Member States’ participation in the EU; strengthens 
democracy in the EU and, fi nally, restrains the power of EU and state decision-makers, 
not only ex ante (during the decision-making phase), but also, despite a number of 
gaps in the judicial protection, ex post, through the judicial review of decisions. Th ese 
achievements of local and regional participation in the EU, although perfectible, are 
important in that they move in the direction of creating a ‘better’ European polity – a 
polity where the principles and ideals of constitutionalism fi nd wider and profounder 
application. Th e current ‘gaps’ and ‘limitations’, or even the shortcomings, of local and 
regional participation in the EU, highlighted in the text, can constitute an agenda for 
reform and improvement of EU governance (for example, creation by the EU institutions 
of stronger forms of dialogue with the local and regional authorities; special attention 
given by EU institutions to sub-national parliaments; introduction of a longer timeframe 
for the delivery of reasoned opinions in the early warning system; recognition of 
privileged applicant status to the local and regional authorities depending on their status 
under domestic constitutional law), for the Member States (creation of more eff ective 
ways to involve the local and regional authorities in national decision-making processes 
linked to the EU) and for the local and regional authorities themselves (for example, 
creation of mechanisms strengthening the role of sub-national parliaments vis-à-vis sub-
national governments; measures enhancing the transparency and accountability of the 
Brussels offi  ces vis-à-vis the local community).
